Rational Russia
Decision-Making in a Declining Superpower
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia demonstrates that Putin’s state still behaves rationally | J. Haley Tucker
In August of 2008, Russia invaded Georgia in a military move that
shocked the globe. The “Five Day
War,” as it has been named, proved to
be a short, but bloody war. Although
provoked by fighting in South Ossetia, the Russian invasion appeared to
be somewhat random and much more
extensive than the world expected.
This article utilizes Graham Allison’s
rational model of decision making to
wade through the propaganda and
ascertain the thinking behind this
move by Russia, as well as the aftermath of the decision. Through the
lens of the rational model, it is clear
that the decision by Russia to invade
in a limited war provided the most
benefits with the least amount of risk.
The Kremlin’s hand was forced to a
decision during the night of August
7, 2008. The events of the previous
six months had culminated in a historic moment. In February, Kosovo had declared independence, and
the world watched as genocide and
conflict ensued. Two months later,
Ukraine and Georgia were denied
a Membership Action Plan (MAP)
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following intense
debate. Although denied, Georgia
was promised a MAP “at some point”
in the future if they still desired. Skirmishes, bombings, and other military
conflicts were ongoing in the regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
Georgia. The two regions under dispute hosted Russian peacekeepers, as
well as Russian military bases, who
worked alongside separatist forces in
each area. The Russian military con-

and fueled fears of losing influence in the
Caucuses. At the time, intervention was
cited as necessary for humanitarian reasons: to stop the mass genocide and ethnic cleansing that was occurring. Russia
utilized this precedent of Western intervention when legitimizing the decision to
invade Georgia.

ducted patrols along the border of
Georgia beginning on July 15. These
exercises were intended to prepare
the Russian 58th army for an “operation of peace enforcement” in either
South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Although
these operations ended on August
2, these troops continued to be stationed at the border until the war
started on the 8th.

In reference to humanitarian concerns,
Putin also compared the overnight
bombing of Tskhinvali to the Srebrenica
genocide in 1995. The Kremlin accused
Georgia of attempting genocide against
South Ossetians, claiming that over two
thousand civilian citizens had died and
insinuating that by taking action, Russia would just be following suit with the
West.

All of these events came to a head
when Mikheil Saakashvili, the President of Georgia, ordered troops to
restore constitutional order in South
Ossetia late on August 7th. Saakashvili had been given intelligence by
Georgian soldiers that Russian troops
were moving through the Roki Tunnel in force, presumably intending
to invade. There is much debate over
whether the Russians invaded first
or the Georgians attacked South
Ossetia. The Georgians assert that
Russia invaded and forced Saakashvili to return fire. The Russians argue
Saakashvili attacked South Ossetia randomly in the night to regain
control of the provinces. Regardless
of which occurred first, Russia was
forced to make a decision in response
to Saakashvili’s military action in
South Ossetia.

In addition, the ability of Russia to claim
that South Ossetians and Abkhazians are
Russian citizens came from a policy of
“passportization,” which began in 2002.
This streamlined process allowed citizens
of surrounding countries to easily gain
Russian citizenship. Though controversial, passportization allowed Russia to
attempt to legitimize impinging upon a
neighboring country’s sovereignty. Despite this attempt, the international community has not recognized these citizenships unless the citizens have renounced
Georgian citizenship officially. Therefore,
Russia uses passportization as legitimacy,
but it is ineffective. However, the Kosovo precedent provided Russia with necessary legitimation for the decision the
Kremlin was about to make.

In order to fully understand this decision, the in-depth factors that precipitated the decision and provided
the rationale for the Kremlin’s position must be assessed. The first is
the Kosovo precedent. When Kosovo
declared its independence in February of 2008, intervention by NATO
and the United States angered Russia
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The rational model of decision making,
outlined by Graham Allison, contains
several basic tenets. One of these is the
precept that the principal actor is a national government or state. In this case,
the principal actor is Russia. Russia acts
unitarily in this decision, despite reports
of disagreement and discord between
Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin
(president and prime minister, respectively, at the time of the war).

There is little consensus over who was
actually making the decisions among the
Russian elite. Many are now saying that
Putin was in control, although he should
not have been involved in foreign policy
as the Prime Minister. A new documentary entitled “The Lost Day” was released
on YouTube accusing Medvedev of slowly responding to the war praised Putin
for his assertiveness and leadership skills.
Speculation indicates that perhaps this
film is purely political to support Putin
in the upcoming election. Putin made
several comments while he was still president regarding his policies of supporting
South Ossetia and Abkhazia through
“not declarative, but material support.”
This indicates that it was well within Putin’s intentions to fully support separatist
interests. Putin was also quoted as saying,
“There was a plan in place, and I think it
is no secret that Russia’s forces acted in
accordance with this plan […] The General Staff drew up this plan somewhere in
late 2006 or early 2007. I approved it.” Not
only does this indicate that the invasion
into Georgia may have been pre-planned,
but also that it was predominantly Putin’s
plan. Despite whose plan it actually was,
the decision to invade was made by the
state of Russia and executed unitarily, as
per the rational model of decision making.
Another key concept in the rational
model is the idea that the action chosen
is the value-maximizing option, given
the state’s goals. Russia’s goals regarding
Georgia cannot be separated from the
Kremlin’s general foreign policy strategies. Russia is highly concerned about
NATO enlargement and understanding
this helps to clarify both the intentions
and the timing of the conflict. Georgia’s
attempts to enter NATO in April sparked
renewed fervor and fueled Russia’s intentions. According to the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,
“Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to
the plans of admitting Ukraine and Geor-

gia to the membership in the alliance, as
well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders
on the whole…” Thus, Russia was highly committed to keeping Georgia from
gaining membership in NATO.
This goal ties in closely with the continued objective of Russia to maintain influence and control over the regions along
the border. Maintaining Russian influence over the Caucuses, as well as deterring a Western advancement towards
the border, has been a major goal of
Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Russia sees itself as a global power, and desires to maintain this position,
especially regionally. These interests provide clarity when thinking about Russia’s
perspective on the importance of Georgia
and its influence in the region.
Another of Russia’s goals concerning
Georgia was to continue supporting the
separatist forces in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, in hopes of absorbing the regions into Russia or at least maintain
regional influence. More than gaining
these regions, Russia desired to prevent
Georgia from regaining full control, thus
increasing Western influence in the region. Russian regional hegemony has lost
much of its potency since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The loss of territory
and power that occurred has left Russia
deeply concerned about increased Western influence and control over the region.
There is quite a bit of evidence, in fact,
that Russia had intended to intervene in
Georgia much earlier than August. In late
May, Russian troops had entered Abkhazia in order to repair railroad tracks that
were not functional. The railroad directly linked Georgia and Russia, allowing
troops and equipment to move much faster during the invasion. This, along with
repeated skirmishes and provocations of
the Georgian government, indicates that
perhaps Russia was pre-planning an invasion in order to regain predominance
in the region.

Fall 2013 | 44

With these goals in mind, utilizing the rational model, one must consider the options
available to Russia at the time of the decision.
Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel have
described four possible options that Russia
could have taken. First, Russia could have
remained passive and simply supported the
separatist forces, as they had been doing by
providing arms and peacekeepers, and avoid
further engagement. Second, Russia could
have initiated a large-scale, short-term intervention, in which troops fully engage militarily to defend the separatists, but return back
to Russian territory after. Third, Russia could
engage in limited war to fully control South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The last option was to
invade completely and occupy either security
zones or the whole of Georgia.
If Russia had chosen to remain passive, it
would have been inconsistent with the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, as well as with
history. This option also would have undermined Russia’s support of the separatists because it would be clear that they did not have
the full backing of the Russian government.
The second option of short-term intervention accomplishes many of the goals of limited war at similar cost, but does not provide
the maximum benefits. Full invasion and
occupation of Georgia provides maximum
benefits to Russia, but with increased cost.
Occupying Georgia would require much
more military involvement and an exponentially higher cost, due to the cost of installing
a puppet government and maintaining order
long-term. There would also have been major
repercussions to Russia’s international reputation. Even in the limited war that Russia
waged in Georgia, the West detected echoes
of a resurgent Cold War Russia. A complete
invasion and occupation of Georgia would
have rekindled anti-Russian sentiment akin
to that of the Cold War era. These costs were
too substantial to be chosen rationally.
Within the rational model, the principal
actor makes the decision that is value-maximizing. Russia chose the option of limited
war because it accomplished the most goals
at the least cost. Limited war meant that Russia would invade, defeat Georgian forces, increase and maintain control of the separatist
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provinces, and then cease. Russia accomplished this task within five days, although
some sources state that forces did not leave
until much later. After international calls for
a ceasefire and much diplomatic negotiation,
a ceasefire agreement was signed which ended the war. During the five days of conflict,
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other
European Union leaders met with President
Medvedev and President Saakashvili. Sarkozy drafted a peace plan, which was eventually agreed upon after much diplomatic
wrangling. After the ceasefire was signed by
both parties, debates continued concerning
whether Russia would follow through with
plans to evacuate troops and abide by the
ceasefire. Much pressure from the international community led to an eventual retreat
and subsequent ending of war.
Russia had successfully met the majority of
its goals in the conflict, with the exception
of completely ending Georgia’s control over
the separatists. In a statement highlighting
Russia’s success in goals regarding NATO,
Medvedev illuminated, “For some of our
partners, including NATO, it was a signal
that they must think about geopolitical stability before making a decision to expand the
alliance.” In other words, the war in Georgia
warned NATO of the potential consequences
of expansion towards Russia.
The costs of the war were minimal for Russia,
with Georgia suffering the majority of the casualties. The Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict of Georgia found that
Russia lost 67 servicemen, while Georgia lost
170 servicemen, 14 policemen, and 228 civilians, with many more injured. In addition to
human cost discrepancies, the Russian government did not suffer many political casualties. Public opinion in Russia greatly supported the war due in part to governmental
control and censorship of media in Russia.
Western response to the war also demonstrated that Russia would face very little consequence for their actions. The West refused
to choose sides between Russia and Georgia
during the war, instead calling for a ceasefire.
Since 2008, President Obama has pursued a
policy to “reset” relations with Russia. This
policy has not included any form of indict-

ment of the war in Georgia. As a result, Russia has succeeded in achieving many of its regional goals with very few real consequences.
The aftermath of the Five Day War remains
to be fully revealed. Not only did Georgia
lose the war, but as noted earlier, it also sustained a much higher degree of casualties.
The impact on Georgians, both in the heart
of the country and in the separatist regions,
was profound. As of this writing, NATO has
yet to offer Georgia a MAP. Although initially seen as the victims of the war, the Georgian government has begun losing support
as the media has focused on discovering the
initiators of the conflict, rather than its full
context. The Saakashvili government also
sustained damage, as Western countries are
now less convinced of Georgia’s ability to
maintain law and order. The aftermath of the
war for Russia, aside from meeting the goals
previously discussed, has been comparatively less damaging. Russia announced its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states. Despite this announcement by Medvedev, very few other states
have followed suit, indicating that perhaps
Russia overstepped its bounds.
Russian foreign policy towards Georgia continues to be ambiguous yet frosty. While
there has yet to be another full-fledged war
between the two states, much of the tension remains. When one regards this conflict through the lens of the rational model,
however, one can ascertain the thinking of
Russian policymakers and leaders. Clear
links exist between Russia’s decisions and the
statements and policies available on public
record. Without question, Russia operates as
a rational actor in the foreign policy world.
Decisions are made based upon pragmatism
and the selection of the value-maximizing
option. All of these factors lead to the conclusion that the decision to go to war with Georgia in the summer of 2008 was a rational and
calculated decision based upon an assessment of the potential options. It will certainly
be interesting to see how Russia implements
future foreign policy objectives regarding the
state of Georgia.
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